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[51 C.2d

IN RE DENNIS

No. 6364.

In Bank.

1\Iar. 2, 1959.]

In re BARNEY A. DENNIS, on Habeas Corpus.
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

Crimin~JJ

Law-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity.-The
by Pen. Code, §
relating to determiwhen doubt thereof arises prior
unu~:lll'-' defendant's present ability
so to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings
taken
him as to be able to conduct his own defense in a
rational manner.
!d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Doubt of Sanity as Basis for Trid.-A stmng showing is required before
an abuse of discretion is deemed to result from the trial court's
failure to order a determination of present sanity; the "doubt"
as to defendant's sanity, requiring trial of such issue under
Pen. Code, § 1368, must arise in the mind of the trial judge
rather than in the mind of defendant's counsel or in that of
any third person.
!d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Doubt of Sanity as Basis for TriaL-Testimony of experts as to insanity in
a general sense is not sufficient to create a doubt as to defendant's sanity, requiring a trial of such issue under Pen. Code,
§ 1368, insofar as that testimony does not relate to defendant's
ability to conduct bis own defense.
!d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Discretion of
Court.-vVhen a doubt of defen(hmt's sanity at the time of
trial as contemplated by Pen. Code, § 1368, appears on the face
of the record as a matter of law, an abuse of discretion is
shown by failure to Ol'der a determination of the question of
sanity, such failure results in a miscarriage of justice, and a
reversal is required.
!d.-Rights of Accused-Presence at TriaL-In a felony case,
the prisoner must be present during: the whole of his trial.
(Const., art. I, § 13; Pen. Code, § 1043.)
Id.-Rights of Accused-Presence at Trial.-The requirement
that defendant he present at eYery stage of a felony prosecu-

------------------------------------------------------[1] Test of present insanity which will preyent trial for crime
or punishment after conviction, note, 3 A.L.R. !)4. See Cal.Jnr.2d,
Criminal Law, § 250 ct seq.; Am.Jur., Trial, § 47 et seq.
See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 142 et seq.; Am.Jur., Criminal Law, § 189 ct seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law,§ 236(1):
3] Criminal Law, ~ 236(2):
Criminal Law, § 236(5); [5-8] Criminal
Law, ~ 115; [9, 11, J2] Criminal Law, ~ 359(8); [10] Criminal
Law,§ 359(9); [13] Habeas Corpus,§ 18; [14] Habeas Corpus,§ 68.
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and mpntally
tion means that he must be both
present; mere physical presence without mental rpa]izaiion of
what is going on would he of no value.
[7] !d.-Rights of Accused-Presence at Trial.~'iVlwn defendant's
presence at his trial will be useful or of benefit to him and his
counsel, the lack of his presenec becomes a denial of due process
of law.
[8] !d.-Rights of Accused-Presence at Trial.-A defendant in a
criminal case must be present at a trial when evidence is
offered, since the opportunity must be his to advise with his
counsel.
[9] Id.-Presumptions-Sanity.-On trial of the issue raised by a
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, there is a rebuttable
presumption that defendant was sane at the time the crime
was committed, and defendant has the burden of proving his
insanity by a preponder::mce of evidence.
[10] Id.- Presumptions- Insanity.- Proof that defendant was
afflicted with a permanent insanity, as distinguished from a
temporary or transient in10anity, prior to commission of the
crime charged will dispel the presumption of sanity and raise
a presumption that his insanity continued to exist until the
time of commission of the crime.
[11] Id.-Presumptions-Sanity.-The presumption of sanity is
disputable and may be overcome by a preponderanee of evidence to the contrary.
[12] !d.-Presumptions-Sanity.-'iVhere the evidence is uncontradicted and entirely to the effect that the aecused is insane,
the precmmption of sanity may not be permitted to prevail.
(Disapproving any implication to the contrary in People v.
Chambc1·lain, 7 Cal.2d 2;)7, 60 P.2d 299.)
[13] Habeas Corpus-Grounds-Violation of Constitutional Rights.
-A conviction of assault with intent to commit murder and
of assault with a deadly weapon should be set aside on habeas
corpus where defendant was tried, convicted and sentenced
while insane, such procedure being in violation of his constitutional rights.
[14] !d.-Judgment-Discharge and Remand.-When a conviction
is set aside on habeas corpus for violation of Jefendant's constitutional
with respect to trial while insane, he must be
remanded to the custody of the sheriff for determination by the
trial court of his present sanity or insanity. If he is found to
be sane, the issue of sanity at the time of commission of the
offenses, as raised by his original plea, should be retried.

[9] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law,
dence, § 215.

~

70 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evi-

& ,} enscn and \Vill iam

,J enspn for Petitioner.

A. Dennis was convietcd and senin 195·1 on two counts of assault with
intent to commit murder and four counts of assault 1rith a
\\-capon.
fol' a
of habeas <:orpus has been
filed on his behalf in this <:ourt.l
contcution is that Dennis
convietcd and
sentenced \vhile insane and that therefore he is
eonfined in San Quentin Prison.
Dennis
in au information \\·ith the
of
his wife and five
officers who came to the
he entered the
of not

Section

that ''A person
for a

court must order
to be detcrminrd
a trial
the court without a
or with

drfz•ndant has been
<:r·imiual
to the diserrtion of
until the determination of the
issue of
''
'l'he trial of defendant eommeneed before ihe court ·without

in this
will l1e r0ferred to as
for llnlJeas c01·pns
in
defendant was
hy this court iu Sc•ptcmhcr, ]
'Houorahlc John A. Hewicker was the trial judge.

an

6G9
the

of

Pxnmin<>r <·tms!ders that Jlis
was
his mcu tal ill nrss and be ]a eked
nm1crstmHl the; nainre and
of
so disonleretl of mim1 that he ·was unable to

''He is

abl(• to <·ooperate with his
in the
of his own drfense at this time.''
;uv• 19. ]
Dr. E!nwr
, and filed with the court on .Jnne 23,
i;l pari, that "r feel that this man
is in,mw;
not a hle to
cooperate with JJiR
attorHey; doz•s uot know the differem•e between
and
wrong; and tlwt th
condition existed at the time of the
assault and
has existe<1 for a
of mauy years.
I believe that he is in need or
; thnt he is potenbeeanse of hi:;; assanHive tendencies
state.''
-k
a letter
adcln•flsed to the distric•t
Count;whi<~h \Yas later introdneed in rvidPm·e at 1he trial. Dr. Snlt
noted that Denni,; had been
fl'Om tlw United States
in 1!H4 "on the basis of
type";
had twice been
thc~rcfor in the San Diego
He eonl"lnded that "In my
ion Barney
Allen Drnnis is insa11e in that he does not know right from
Y\Tong. It
likewise my
that at the time of the shoot"'rho
obviously

stamped filing date of '' .Jun 1-1954'' which is
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in
he also was insane and did not know right from
wrong. He is snffering with Schizophrenia, paranoid type.
"DisCi/.~sioft:
type, is a t~hronic,
incurable disease. It is my opinion that this man should be
committed to a State Hospital for the criminally insane for
the remainder of his life. Hegardless of how well he would
appear to recover under any form of treatment, he would be a
threat to
"
In a report dated
2,
and filed with the court on
,July 3, 1954, Dr. C. E. Lengyel, a psychiatrist, who examined
Dennis at the request of the District Attorney of San Diego
County, stated that ''I saw this man on a previous oceasion
on July 23, 1948. At that time I described him as being
aggressive, arrogant, uncooperative, and belligerent. My diagnosis at that time was dementia praecox, paranoid type. I
considered him to be psychotic then, and I do now.
''Diagnosis: Schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type.
"It is my opinion that this man was psychotic at the time
of commission of the act, namely shooting several people. I
feel that the type of condition that he is suffering from is a
chronic type of psychosis; that he presents a hazard to others
for he is paranoid, aggressive, and unpredictable. He reacts on
impulse, and it is my opinion that this man will probably
never recover.''
Drs. Crowley, Lengyel and Peterson testified at the trial in
accordance with their reports, and Dr. Sult 's report was admitted in evidence. The People presented no evidence to the
contrary.
[1] 'l'his court held in People v . .llparicio, 38 Cal.2d 565,
567 [241 P.2d 221], that "The sanity contemplated by the code
section is tested by appraising the present ability of the defendant to so understand the nature and purpose of the
proceedings taken against him as to be able to conduct his own
defense in a rational manner. (People v. Perry, 14 Cal.2d
387, 399 [94 P.2d 559, 124 A.L.R. 1123]; In re Buchanan, 129
Cal. 330, 334 [61 P. 1120, 50 L.R.A. 378]; People v. West,
25 Cal.App. 369 [143 P. 793]; see also 3 A.I1.R 94.) [2] A
strong showing is required before an abuse of discretion is
deemed to result from the failure of the trial court to order
a determination of present sanity. It was said in People v.
Lindley, 26 Cal.2d 780, at 789 [161 P.2d 227]: "l'he "doubt"
mentioned is one that mnst arise in the mind of the trial
jndge, rather than in the mind of counsel for the defendant
or in that of any third person (People v. Perry, supra, 14 Cal.
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2d 387, 399
124 A.T_j.R.
, and eases there
and the determination of a motion for a
upon
the issue of a defendant's
at the time of the trial is one
which rests within the sound discretion of the court. Necessarily, an appellate court cannot measure to a
the basis
for the ruling, and the trial judge must be allowed a wide
latitude (citing cases) ... ' [3] Even the
of experts as to insanity in a general sense is not sufficient to create
a doubt insofar as that testimony does not relate to the defendant's ability to conduct his own defense. (People v. Darling,
107 Cal.App.2d 635 [237 P.2d 691] ; see also People v. Huntoon, 41 Cal.App. 392 [182 P. 776] .) [4] However, when a
doubt of the defendant's sanity at the time of the trial as
contemplated by the statute appears on the face of the record
as a matter of law, an abuse of discretion is shown and the
failure to order a determination of the question of sanity
results in a miscarriage of justice and a reversal is required.
(People v. Vester, 135 Cal.App. 223 [26 P.2cl 685]; People v.
West, supra, 25 Cal.App. 369.)" (People v. 1Ylerkouris, 46
Cal.2d 540, 553 [297 P.2d 999] .)
Bearing the above rule in mind, it appears that all of the
reports which were filed prior to trial were to the effect that
the defendant was not only insane at the time of the commission of the offenses but was insane at the time of trial, and two
of them specifically pointed out that he was unable to cooperate
with his attorney in conducting his defense. All of the testimony at the trial was to the same effect as heretofore noted.
The petitioner here alleges upon information and belief that
after defendant was imprisoned, the court-appointed attorney
who then represented him filed a notice of appeal; that the
appeal was thereafter dismissed by the attorney at the request
of defendant's mother while the defendant was still insane
and imprisoned at the 'l'erminal Island Medical Facility.
It is argued by petitioner that defendant was, in legal effect,
deprived of his constitutional right to be present at his trial
because his mental condition prevented him from knowing
what was occurring and that this lack of mental presence
constituted a denial of due process of la-w. [5] In People v.
Berling, 115 Cal.App.2d 255, 267, 268 [251 P.2d 1017], the
court held that ''Article I, section 13, of the California Constitution gives a defendant the right to appear and defend in
person, and section 1043 of the Penal Code provides that 'If
the prosecution be for a felony, the defendant must be present
at the trial.' (Italics added.) The rule is familiar and funda-

above rcthat a defendant be present
of a felis that the accused person
present. Mere
presence
without mental realization of what \Yas
on would obbe of no value to the accused. A defpndant in such
condition "WOuld be unable to confer with or assists ···'".""'"'"
unable to
and without
to understand the nature
of the accusation or the mechanics or consqucnees of the trial.
An interpretation of the rule
enee would lead to such an
an imbecile or an insane person without the least understandof what
in the c-ourtroom.
in the
most unenlightened age could such a so-called trial be countenanced.''
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the
states may not take away from a defendant notice of the
charge against him and an adequate opportunity to be heard
in defense of it. ('!'wining v. New J erscy, 211 U.S. 78, 110, 111
[29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97] ; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
68, 71 [ 33 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R 527] ; Holmes v.
Conway, 241 U.S. 624, 632 [36 S.Ct. 681, 60 L.Ed. 1211] ;
v.
291 U.S. 97, 105 [54 S.Ct. 330, 78
L.Ed. 674, 90 A.L.R.
.)
v.
291
l'J.S. 97, 106, 107, 108, the
Court of the United
States held: ''So far as the Pourteenth Amendment is concerned, the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just
would be thwarted
by his absence, and to that extent only.'' 'l'he court discussed
the matter of the presence of the defendant in various
of the proceedings against him as an clement of due process.
The court stated : ''In all the cases thus assumed the presence
of the defendant satisfies the test that was put forward a
moment ago as basic and decisive. It bears, or may fairly be
assumed to bear, a rc>lation, reasonably substantial, to his opportunity to defend. Nov,-here in the decisions of this court is
there a dictum, and still less a ruling, that the Pourteenth
Amendment assures the privilege of presence when presence
would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.'' [7] In other
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supra.''

In
299], where 10
long professional
out
affirmed a judgment entered upon a
defendant sane which 1vas
of sanity. It was held that "'fhe
appearance, mannerisms and actions of the defendant before the jurors during
the trial, and the character of his
and mann0r of
giving it, were matters properly to be considered
them.
\Ve cannot say that the
the defendant iu these
partieulars during the
at the trial in their
the
defendant was sane, did not have suff\cient evidcnee on which
to base the verdiet in this case.''
vV e held in
v.
Baker, 42 Ca1.2d
5G<±
P.2d
"On the trial
of the issue raised
the
there is a rebuttable
at the time the crime was committed
518;
v.
159 Cal. 6, 11
1912B 1193] ;
184
1019];
P. 1117];
779] ; People v.
and defendant has the
preponderance of the evidence
2d 876, 901 [256 P.2d 911]). [10] Proof that defendant
was afflicted with a permanent
as
from
a temporary or transient insanity, prior to the commission of
51 C.2d-22
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the crime
sanity and raise a presumption
to exist until the time of tlw commission of the
v.
31 Cal. 576, 581;
188-191;
101 Cal.
People v.
106 Cal.
53
Fi11dlcy, 132 CaL 301, 307 [64 P.
Cal. 794, 800-801 [175 P. 6]; State
Ore. 291, 299-309 [225 P.2d 771] and authorities cited; see
8 Cal.J ur., § 143; 27 A.hR2d 121 ; 1 \Yharton 's Criminal
Evidence, § 212 [11th ed. 1935].)" [11] It is apparent
from the rules set forth in People v. Baker, supra, that the
presumption of sanity is a disputable one v;hieh may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary.
[12] \Yhere, as here, the evidence is uncontradicted and
entirrly to the effect that the accused is
the presumption of sanity may not be permitted to prevail.
implication to the contrary in People v.
supra, 7 Cal.
2d 257, heretofore cited and
is hereby
[13] Since the proecdure here vms in dear violation of
petitioner's constitutional rights, the emwietion must be set
aside (In re James, 38 Cal.2d 302, 313 [240 P .2d 596]).
[14] Petitioner is not entitled to his
and the trial
eourt should now determine whether he is presently sane (Pen.
Code, §§ 1367, 1368) and if so retry the issue of his sanity at
the time of the eommission of the offenses.
The writ is granted, the return to the order to show cause
cause shall Ntand as thP return to the writ, and the defendant
is diseharged from the eustody of the wardell at San Quentin
and eommitted to the eustody of the sheriff of San Diego
County for further proeeedings in the
c·ourt of that
eounty.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Sehauer, J., Spenee, J.,
and MeComb, J., eoneurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied April 1,
1959.

